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THE SOCIAL INSURANCE CRISIS AND 
THE PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE SAVING: 
A COMMENTARY ON SHAVIRO’S 
RECKLESS DISREGARD 
David I. Walker* 
Abstract: Long-range Social Security and Medicare spending projections 
vastly exceed projected program revenues. If left unchecked, the resulting 
ªscal imbalance (estimated at $40 to $70 trillion in present value terms) 
would fall primarily on future generations. To avoid generational in-
equity, and perhaps ªscal meltdown, Professor Daniel N. Shaviro and 
others propose immediate ªscal austerity. This reply Commentary argues 
that near-term austerity is unlikely to play a signiªcant role in overcoming 
the ªscal imbalance, which can be thought of as a balloon payment due 
in the mid-twenty-ªrst century. Signiªcant near-term ªscal austerity would 
eliminate the public debt and replace it with a public surplus. Political 
economy theory and U.S. public debt history suggest that this path is 
infeasible.  This Commentary also stresses the importance of disaggre-
gating the “Social Security and Medicare” problems. Contrary to popular 
belief, Medicare is by far the larger problem, and the Medicare imbalance 
is driven by projected spending increases, outpacing overall economic 
growth indeªnitely. These observations suggest that a focus on Medicare 
cost control, rather than revenue enhancement, is called for. 
Introduction 
 Despite a projected social insurance ªscal crisis resulting from 
increased longevity and rising healthcare costs, the Bush administra-
tion has continued to advocate tax cuts and recently has sponsored 
and signed an unfunded prescription drug entitlement, exacerbating 
the current deªcit situation. In Reckless Disregard: The Bush administra-
tion’s Policy of Cutting Taxes in the Face of an Enormous Fiscal Gap, Profes-
sor Daniel N. Shaviro argues that rather than decreasing the size of 
the government through limiting discretionary spending as the Bush 
administration apparently hopes, the growing deªcits and ªscal gap 
                                                                                                                      
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. For their valuable sug-
gestions and contributions, I would like to thank my colleagues Alan Feld and Ted Sims, as 
well as the participants in the symposium in which these papers were presented. 
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(the present value of projected expenditures over revenues) will result 
in an enormous intergenerational transfer that actually represents 
larger government and unfairly burdens future generations with the 
cost of providing the baby boom generation with a secure and healthy 
retirement.1 Professor Shaviro argues that the Bush administration 
and Congress should reverse course and exercise ªscal restraint.2 
 This reply Commentary focuses on two issues that, although tan-
gential to Professor Shaviro’s analysis, ultimately relate to both his fair-
ness and size of government arguments. First, commentators routinely 
speak of a “Social Security and Medicare” problem in the singular, but 
it is important in evaluating potential solutions and in considering Pro-
fessor Shaviro’s “size of government” argument to disaggregate the pro-
grams.3 Contrary to popular belief, Medicare is by far the larger prob-
lem, and the Medicare ªscal gap is driven largely by projected spending 
increases, outpacing increases in gross domestic product (“GDP”) for 
many years to come.4 This suggests that Medicare may be an appropri-
ate “big government” target and that cost control should be the focus 
of our attack.5 
 Second, it is questionable whether near-term ªscal austerity is 
likely to have much bearing on the ultimate solutions to our social in-
surance problems or on how the burden of those solutions is divided 
among present and future generations.6 To reduce the burden on fu-
ture generations in a meaningful way through near-term ªscal austerity 
would require a combination of tax increases and spending cuts that 
would replace the public debt with a near-term public surplus.7 The 
United States’ history of public (dis)saving and political economy the-
ory suggest that this strategy is infeasible, at least within the current 
budgetary framework.8 We cannot “save” our way out of these prob-
lems, and thus, we should begin curtailing future beneªts today.9 
                                                                                                                      
1 See generally Daniel N. Shaviro, Reckless Disregard: The Bush Administration’s Policy of Cut-
ting Taxes in the Face of an Enormous Fiscal Gap, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 1285 (2004). 
2 See generally id. 
3 See infra notes 13–32 and accompanying text. 
4 See Shaviro, supra note 1, at 1299, 1302–03. 
5 See id. 
6 See infra notes 34–61 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 34–39 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 40–51 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 52–62 and accompanying text. 
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I. The Problem 
 Professor Shaviro eloquently described the problem facing us, 
and this section will reiterate only a few key points. As a result of in-
creased longevity, escalating healthcare costs, and the impending re-
tirement of the baby boomers, our pay-as-you-go social insurance pro-
grams will not be sustainable under current funding and spending 
rules. The Congressional Budget Ofªce (the “CBO”) has projected 
combined Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid spending to rise 
from 8% of GDP in 2004 to 9% by 2012, 17% by 2040, and 25% by 
2075.10 These obligations do not show up in snapshot deªcit and pub-
lic debt ªgures; in fact, Social Security and Medicare currently are 
producing surpluses which mask the size of the “rest of government” 
deªcits.11 Recent analyses, however, put the “ªscal gap”—the current 
public debt plus the present value of projected non-interest expendi-
tures minus projected revenues under current law—at $44 to $74 tril-
lion.12 This shortfall is almost entirely attributable to the social insur-
ance funding gap and dwarfs the actual public debt, which at the end 
of 2003 was about $4 trillion.13 
 This path is not sustainable and ultimately must result in a combi-
nation of tax increases and spending cuts. In addition, unless soon re-
versed, the ªscal imbalance will result in an unprecedented transfer of 
wealth from future to current generations. One can think of the situa-
tion as pay-as-you-go ªnancing with an enormous balloon payment (on 
the order of $40 to $70 trillion) accruing interest and due in, say, 2050. 
                                                                                                                      
10 See Cong. Budget Ofªce, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 
2005 to 2014, at xiv ( Jan. 2004) [hereinafter Budget and Economic Outlook] (provid-
ing estimate for 2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4985/01-26-
BudgetOutlook-EntireReport.pdf; Alan J. Auerbach et al., The Budget Outlook and Options for 
Fiscal Policy, 95 Tax Notes 1639, 1648 (2002) (providing Congressional Budget Ofªce 
(“CBO”) projections based on the January 2002 budget forecast). Recently, the CBO has 
provided the following “intermediate spending path” forecast for combined Social Secu-
rity, Medicare, and Medicaid spending as a percentage of gross domestic product 
(“GDP”): 9% in 2010, 14.3% in 2030, and 17.7% in 2050. See Cong. Budget Ofªce, The 
Long-Term Budget Outlook 7 (Dec. 2003) [hereinafter Long-Term Budget Out-
look]; available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4916/Report.pdf. These ªgures 
are roughly consistent. 
11 See Budget and Economic Outlook, supra note 10, at 12 tbl.1-6 (reporting 2003 So-
cial Security and Medicare trust fund surpluses of $156 billion and $8 billion, respectively). 
12 See Jagadeesh Gokhale & Kent Smetters, Fiscal and Generational Imbalances: 
New Budget Measures for New Budget Priorities 27 tbl.2 (2003) (estimating the ªscal 
gap at $44 trillion); Shaviro, supra note 1, at 1299 (estimating the ªscal gap at $74 trillion 
based on the “ºow” ªscal gap calculation provided in Auerbach et al., supra note 10). In both 
cases, expenditures and funding are projected into perpetuity. 
13 See Budget and Economic Outlook, supra note 10, at 3 tbl.1-2. 
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The question is whether those working in 2050 and beyond can and 
should bear this entire burden, or whether and to what extent those 
working and those retired today should bear a share through increased 
taxes, reduced beneªts, or both. (Of course, previous generations also 
contributed to this problem, but it is too late to do anything about that.) 
II. Disaggregating “Social Security and Medicare” 
 If the U.S. government stays on the present course, spending 
soon will overwhelm funding for both Social Security and Medicare, 
but the problems under the two systems actually have quite different 
dimensions. Whether viewed in terms of its share of the ªscal gap or 
its growing share of total federal expenditures, Medicare is by far the 
larger problem, and Medicare is a much longer-term problem than 
Social Security. 
 In a 2002 study, Jagadeesh Gokhale and Kent Smetters estimated 
that 83% of the long-term ªscal imbalance was attributable to Medi-
care and 16% to Social Security.14 Remaining federal programs were 
basically in balance. There are two problems, however, with this analy-
sis.15 First, although Medicare Part B (Supplementary Medical Insur-
ance) is funded through participant premiums and transfers from 
general funds rather than through payroll taxes, Gokhale and Smet-
ters include only the premium receipts in calculating the Part B gap.16 
This approach could be viewed as overstating the overall Medicare 
imbalance, but this is not too serious a problem because the ªscal gap 
attributable to Medicare Part A alone is almost three times the size of 
the Social Security gap.17 Second, and more important, dividing the 
imbalance between Social Security and Medicare could be considered 
arbitrary, at least on the funding side. Most Americans do not distin-
guish between payroll taxes dedicated to Social Security and those 
dedicated to Medicare. 
 Thus, it may be more appropriate to focus solely on expendi-
tures, although the outcome is much the same. The CBO recently 
projected that spending for Social Security, absent changes, will rise 
                                                                                                                      
14 See Gokhale & Smetters, supra note 12, at 25; see also Ronald Lee & Ryan Edwards, 
The Fiscal Effects of Population Aging in the U.S.: Assessing the Uncertainties, in 16 Tax Policy 
and the Economy 141, 162 ( James M. Poterba ed., 2002) (estimating that only about 
one-eighth of projected growth in federal spending is attributable to retirement pro-
grams including Social Security). 
15 See Gokhale & Smetters, supra note 12, at 25. 
16 See id. at 29. 
17 See id. at 26 tbl.2. 
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from 4.2% of GDP in 2003 to 6.2% of GDP in 2050.18 At that point, 
however, few of the baby boomers will still be living, and Social Secu-
rity spending through the rest of the century would be basically ºat. 
 Because of the tie to actual healthcare expenditures, Medicare 
cost projections are much more uncertain. Under their “middle-cost 
scenario,” however, the CBO projects Medicare spending to increase 
from 2.4% of GDP today to 8.3% in 2050.19 Medicare cost increases, 
moreover, are expected to continue to outpace GDP growth for the 
remainder of the century, leading Ronald Lee and Ryan Edwards to 
conclude that retirement programs, including Social Security, will ac-
count for only about one-eighth of the growth in federal spending 
over the twenty-ªrst century, with healthcare for the elderly account-
ing for the bulk of the rest.20 
 Public perception of the relative magnitude of the Social Security 
and Medicare problems appears to be exactly the opposite of reality. 
Friends and colleagues whom I have queried uniformly believe that 
Social Security represents the larger problem, and that was my view 
before embarking on this project. It is interesting to consider brieºy 
why this misperception exists. New York Times columnist Paul Krugman 
essentially blames a vast right wing conspiracy that is attempting to 
scare Americans into accepting privatization of Social Security by 
lumping the programs together and making the ªscal situation look 
more desperate than it is.21 But, if so, why have defenders of Social 
Security not made more of the fact that this discrete program is rela-
tively solvent? Perhaps liberals believe it will be easier to save Medicare 
by tying its fate to a more politically popular Social Security program. 
 Whatever the reason for the common misperception, recognizing 
that Medicare represents the lion’s share of the social insurance prob-
lem in this country has important implications. Unlike Social Security, 
the Medicare problem is driven in large part by real growth in expen-
ditures, is relatively distant, and, as a result, is more uncertain.22 As 
                                                                                                                      
18 See Long-Term Budget Outlook, supra note 10, at 19. 
19 See id. at 32. 
20 See Lee & Edwards, supra note 14, at 162. 
21 See Paul Krugman, Social Security Scares, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 2004, at A23. 
22 Projected Medicare cost growth is about equally attributable to demographic shifts 
and to growth in real spending per enrollee, estimated by the Medicare Trustees to outpace 
per capita GDP growth by one percentage point annually through 2080. See Long-Term 
Budget Outlook, supra note 10, at 4–5; Gokhale & Smetters, supra note 12, at 23. 
Although a relatively small part of the overall story, the Social Security situation better 
exempliªes the picture painted by Professor Shaviro. According to Gokhale and Smetters, 
the Social Security ªscal imbalance is attributable entirely to past and current generations. 
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Professor Shaviro observes, Social Security payments are pure cash 
transfers that have little allocative effect on the economy.23 Medicare, 
however, is another story. Again, as Professor Shaviro notes, “Its incen-
tive and income effects have surely been huge contributors to the 
enormous growth of healthcare expenditure, both absolutely and 
relative to the economy, in recent decades.”24 
 That growth indeed has been enormous. Total national health 
expenditures (“NHE”) have grown from 5.1% of GDP to 14.1% be-
tween 1960 and 2001.25 The differential growth rate has slowed in re-
cent years, but even in the last decade, average annual NHE growth 
exceeded GDP growth by 1.5%.26 In addition, Medicare spending has 
grown more rapidly than private healthcare spending, with Medicare 
costs increasing from 4.1% of total NHE in 1967 (the year of Medi-
care’s inception) to 17% in 2001.27 Of course, a large part of differen-
tial Medicare growth can be attributed to demographics, but even on 
a cost-per-enrollee basis, Medicare cost increases continue to outpace 
both GDP and overall NHE growth rates.28 The 1% excess growth rate 
projected by the Medicare Trustees would actually be a signiªcant 
improvement over recent history: between 1980 and 2003, Medicare 
spending growth outpaced GDP growth by 2.3 percentage points.29 
 The history and projections suggest two conclusions. First, efforts 
to manage the Medicare ªscal gap should be focused on the expendi-
ture side of the equation. Second, and related, Medicare is an appro-
priate “big government” target. Professor Shaviro argues that, rather 
than decreasing the size of government by limiting spending as the 
Bush administration seems to hope, the intergenerational redistribu-
                                                                                                                      
The present value of payroll tax contributions by future generations actually exceeds the 
present value of their receipts. See Gokhale & Smetters, supra note 12, at 28. Thus, it 
appears that pay-as-you-go Social Security ªnancing would be sustainable going forward. 
This also suggests that if the Social Security beneªts of current retirees and the baby 
boomers ultimately are curtailed to some extent, this would not be generationally unfair. 
Past and current retirees and the baby boomers simply failed to fund the system ade-
quately. Of course, signiªcant beneªt reductions could create tremendous hardship and 
may be politically infeasible, but compared with massive tax increases down the road, 
beneªt cuts would increase generational equity. 
23 See Shaviro, supra note 1, at 1317. 
24 See id. at 1318. 
25 Long-Term Budget Outlook, supra note 10, at 4. 
26 See id. 
27 Id. 
28 See id.; see also Lee & Edwards, supra note 14, at 171 (arguing that the most impor-
tant sources of uncertainty in Medicare spending forecasts are fertility rates and excess 
growth rates). 
29 See Long-Term Budget Outlook, supra note 10, at 4. 
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tion that inevitably will arise under current policies actually represents 
larger government.30 Frankly, however, this is not the kind of “big 
government” issue that Republicans salivate over. A public Medicare 
system comprising 8% or more of GDP is. 
 The other notable aspect of the Medicare situation is that the 
Medicare balloon payment facing future generations largely is attribut-
able to funding and spending imbalances that will occur after current 
generations are gone.31 As a result of the persistent differential between 
the projected growth in Medicare costs and GDP, only about 40% of the 
present value difference between projected expenditures and revenues 
is attributable to past and current generations.32 Forty percent is a large 
burden to pass on to future generations, but even if one is skeptical of 
our ability to rein in Medicare costs, generational fairness does not re-
quire living generations to account for the entire Medicare ªscal gap. 
III. The Problem of Collective Saving 
 Part II of this Commentary demonstrates that the U.S. social in-
surance crisis is largely a Medicare crisis and suggests that expenditure 
control is the most promising avenue of attack, but it does not explain 
why closing the gap through increased funding is not equally plausi-
ble.33 This Part illustrates why signiªcant pre-funding of future social 
insurance obligations through near-term ªscal austerity is unrealistic. 
 Returning to the balloon payment analogy, one can envision 
projected ªscal obligations as funded through a pay-as-you-go system 
plus a $40 to $70 trillion balloon payment accruing interest and due 
mid-twenty-ªrst century.34 Short of an economic miracle, it is ex-
tremely difªcult to imagine mid-twenty-ªrst century taxpayers paying 
off this balloon on their own, and even if they could, the result would 
be generationally unfair. If Congress were to institute a signiªcant 
program of ªscal austerity today, we conceivably could spread that 
burden over several generations, thus reducing the risk of a ªscal 
meltdown and increasing generational fairness. Our public 
(dis)saving history and the political economy of public saving, how-
ever, suggest that near-term ªscal austerity is unlikely to play a 
signiªcant role in alleviating the burden on subsequent generations. 
                                                                                                                      
30 See Shaviro, supra note 1, at 1313–23. 
31 See Gokhale & Smetters, supra note 12, at 29. 
32 See id. 
33 See supra notes 13–32 and accompanying text. 
34 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (explaining the balloon payment analogy). 
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A. Building a Public Surplus 
 At the end of 2003, the public debt stood at just under $4 trillion.35 
Professor Shaviro cites two recent studies placing the “stock” ªscal 
gap—the present value of future tax increases or spending cuts needed 
to maintain the public debt at the current fraction of GDP—at $44 to 
$74 trillion, ten to almost twenty times the current debt, and notes that 
these estimates fail to reºect the latest round of tax cuts and the new 
Medicare prescription drug beneªt.36 No one suggests, of course, that 
we catch up all at once. In 2002, Alan Auerbach, William Gale, and Pe-
ter Orszag projected that a permanent combination of tax increases 
and spending cuts amounting to 11% of GDP was necessary to close the 
ªscal gap.37 This was the level of austerity needed, according to that 
projection, to maintain the public debt at the current fraction of GDP 
over the long term, and maintaining a stable ratio of debt to GDP over 
the long term is required to keep the cost of servicing that debt from 
overwhelming the non-interest portion of the budget.38 
 Moreover, every year of delay in implementing austerity increases 
the ultimate pain. If Congress does not act until 2012, the required 
combination of perpetual tax increases and spending cuts necessary 
to eliminate the ªscal gap in Auerbach, Gale, and Orszag’s most plau-
sible scenario would rise from 11% to 12.6% of GDP.39 Although not 
expressly stated, Professor Shaviro presumably believes that we should 
reverse course immediately and institute a ªscal austerity program on 
this order. 
 The situation has worsened since Auerbach, Gale, and Orszag pub-
lished their 2002 study. The passage of an unfunded Medicare prescrip-
tion drug beneªt must have increased the ªscal gap substantially. Ig-
noring this increase, however, and using the ªgures discussed above, 
imagine if Congress were to enact a combination of tax increases and 
spending cuts amounting to 11% of GDP today and to maintain this 
program in perpetuity. Because the large increases in ªscal demands 
                                                                                                                      
35 See Budget and Economic Outlook, supra note 10, at 3 tbl.1-2. 
36 See Shaviro, supra note 1, at 1293. Jagadeesh Gokhale and Kent Smetters provided 
the $44 trillion ªgure. Gokhale & Smetters, supra note 12, at 27 tbl.2. The $74 trillion 
ªgure is calculated by Professor Shaviro and based on Alan Auerbach, William Gale, and 
Peter Orszag’s projection of the “ºow” ªscal gap described below. See Auerbach et al., supra 
note 10, at 1644 tbl.4; Daniel N. Shaviro, The Growing U.S. Fiscal Gap, World Econ. J., 
Oct.–Dec. 2002, at 2–3. 
37 See Auerbach et al., supra note 10, at 1644 tbl.4; Shaviro, supra note 1, at 1293. 
38 See Long-Term Budget Outlook, supra note 10, at 3. 
39 See Auerbach et al., supra note 10, at 1649. 
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are not projected to occur for twenty or thirty years, we would rapidly 
build a public surplus. Unless this surplus were somehow sequestered 
from the general public debt calculations, by 2007 the public debt 
would be eliminated entirely. By 2014 our current $4 trillion public 
debt would be replaced with a $10 trillion public surplus.40 Ultimately, 
this collective savings bubble would be drawn down as the baby boom-
ers retire, but is the creation of this savings bubble feasible within the 
conªnes of our current budget and social insurance structures? Our 
national public (dis)saving experience says no. 
B. Empirical Evidence on Public (Dis)saving 
 This nation has carried a public debt consistently since its incep-
tion.41 The United States never has been in a surplus situation, al-
though we came close to eliminating the debt in the 1830s.42 Over the 
last forty years public debt has swelled dramatically in nominal terms, 
from $250 billion to almost $4 trillion, but debt as a fraction of GDP 
has been relatively steady, ranging from about 25% to 50% of GDP 
and averaging about 36%.43 Moreover, annual budget surpluses have 
been rare, occurring only ªve times during this forty-year period.44 As 
an empirical observation, it would seem that the federal government 
is inexperienced, to the say the least, at creating public nest eggs. 
 One might think, however, that the Social Security and Medicare 
trust funds have been a mechanism for increasing public saving. In 
recent years, payroll tax receipts have far outpaced Social Security and 
Medicare drawdowns, resulting in signiªcant increases in the trust 
funds. At the end of 2003, the combined trust fund balances ex-
ceeded $1.8 trillion.45 The trust funds, of course, are no more than 
                                                                                                                      
40 Calculations based on data from Budget and Economic Outlook, supra note 10, 
at 3 tbl.1-2. 
41 See Bureau of the Pub. Debt, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Historical Debt Out-
standing—Annual 1791–1849, at http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/opd/opdhisto1.htm 
(last updated Jan. 31, 2001). 
42 See id. 
43 See Budget and Economic Outlook, supra note 10, at 129–30 tbls.F-1, F-2. 
44 See id. The only meaningful surpluses occurred between 1998 and 2001 and largely 
were attributable to the economic boom of the 1990s. 
45 See Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., Total Medicare Income, Expen-
ditures, and Trust Fund Assets During Fiscal Years 1970–2012, at http://www.cms. 
hhs.gov/publications/trusteesreport/2003/tabiia2.asp (last modiªed Sept. 17, 2004) (pre-
senting data from Bds. of Trs., Fed. Hosp. Ins. & Fed. Supplementary Med. Ins. Trust 
Funds, 2004 Annual Report of the Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital 
Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds 3 tbl.I.C1 
(2004), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/publications/trusteesreport/2004/tr.pdf); 
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inter-governmental accounting entries. The trust fund balances are 
“invested” in government securities, but the T-bills, notes, or other 
securities representing the trust fund balances are not set aside. They 
simply represent an “I.O.U.” from the federal government’s general 
revenue to the social insurance systems. The projections suggest that 
if we remain on our current path, the trust funds will be exhausted in 
twenty-two years (Medicare) to thirty-eight years (Social Security).46 
The narrow question, however, is whether the existence of these trust 
funds and recent large balances have had any effect on public saving. 
 Apparently, they have not. In 1985, the combined trust fund bal-
ances stood at $74 billion, less than 2% of GDP.47 The total public debt 
at the end of that year was $1.5 trillion, 36% of GDP.48 At the end of 
2003, the trust fund balances were $1.8 trillion, representing about 
17% of GDP.49 Total public debt was $3.9 trillion at the end of last year, 
again about 36% of GDP.50 The 15% of GDP increase in the trust fund 
balances appears to have been completely offset by other tax cuts or 
spending increases. Put another way, if the government were to borrow 
enough money to fund fully (and to segregate) the trust fund balances, 
public debt would jump to 53% of GDP.51 Eyeball empiricism suggests 
that the massive increases in the Social Security and Medicare trust 
funds have had no impact on the overall level of public debt. 
C. Is Collective Saving Feasible? 
 If actual dollars need to be set aside (instead of simply passed be-
tween generations in a pay-as-you-go system) to promote generational 
fairness or to avoid a social insurance crisis in the future, it is not clear 
                                                                                                                      
Soc. Sec. Admin., Trust Fund Data: Old Age, Survivors, & Disability Insurance 
Trust Funds, 1957–2003, at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4a3.html (last up-
dated Feb. 12, 2004) (presenting data from Bd. of Trs., Fed. Old-Age & Survivors Ins. 
& Disability Ins. Trust Funds, The 2004 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees 
of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust 
Funds 4 tbl.II.B1 (2004), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR04/tr04.pdf). 
46 See Soc. Sec. & Medicare Bds. of Trs., A Summary of the 2004 Annual Reports, 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRSUM/trsummary.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004). 
47 See Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., supra note 45; Soc. Sec. Admin., su-
pra note 45; see also Budget and Economic Outlook, supra note 10, at 139 tbl.F-11 (re-
porting 1985 GDP as $4.1 trillion). 
48 See Budget and Economic Outlook, supra note 10, at 139 tbl.F-11. 
49 See Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., supra note 45; Soc. Sec. Admin., su-
pra note 45; see also Budget and Economic Outlook, supra note 10, at 139 tbl.F-11 (re-
porting that GDP at the end of 2003 was $10.8 trillion). 
50 See Budget and Economic Outlook, supra note 10, at 139 tbl.F-11. 
51 See id. 
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that a collective approach to saving is superior to individual saving, or 
that a collective approach is even feasible. Individuals may suffer from 
myopia, but they have strong incentives to ensure their own well-being.52 
Individuals who accurately assess their future needs can save for the fu-
ture with relative security. It is possible that their savings will be eroded 
by inºation or conªscatory wealth taxation, but generally, they get to 
spend in retirement what they set aside today, as well as the earnings on 
those funds. Thus, they have every incentive to plan and to save. 
 Collective public saving, however, is more problematic. First, 
myopia does not disappear in the public setting. Perhaps the Bush 
administration’s apparent indifference to the coming ªscal crisis re-
ºects public myopia. The Bush administration may be irrationally op-
timistic about the prospects for economic growth (despite the fact 
that much of the budget grows with GDP), or it may believe that 
technical innovation ultimately will reduce the costs of healthcare. 
 In fact, individual myopia likely is magniªed in the public sphere. 
Professor Shaviro and others urge abandoning a myopic ªxation with 
current deªcits, debt levels, and ten-year budget outlooks, but I have 
yet to see a public ofªcial campaigning on a net present value budget 
analysis platform, and the salience of deªcit and debt ªgures cannot 
be ignored.53 If anything, the evidence suggests worsening public 
myopia as sunset provisions are added to tax legislation to improve 
the optics of cuts while attempting to tie the hands of future Con-
gresses.54 Few people would manage their own household budgets in 
this fashion. People may be individually myopic, but they do not sim-
ply ignore budgetary issues more than ten years out. 
 Second, collective public saving could be viewed as a collective 
action problem. Why should I agree to pay more taxes today and help 
build a collective nest egg, when other generations may shirk their 
obligations or divert the surplus we have built to Mars exploration or 
foreign wars? The shirking problem is particularly acute because the 
ªscal demands do not peak for many years.55 The Bush administra-
tion’s policies may reºect shirking instead of, or in addition to, myo-
                                                                                                                      
52 Social Security and Medicare can be seen as a response to individual myopia. If indi-
viduals tend to be unrealistically optimistic about enjoying good health or high investment 
returns in the future, they may save too little in purely private retirement and retiree in-
surance programs. 
53 See Gokhale & Smetters, supra note 12, at 1–6; Auerbach et al., supra note 10, at 
1648, 1653–54; Shaviro, supra note 1, at 1289–94. 
54 See Auerbach et al., supra note 10, at 1645. 
55 See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text for an explanation of the projected 
increased costs of U.S. social insurance programs. 
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pia, and shirking would not be irrational here, because there is no 
way to bind future generations to a course of ªscal restraint. 
 Third, in crass political terms, the problem with collective saving 
is that future generations do not vote. Our pay-as-you-go system has 
worked effectively for as long as it has because the political muscle of 
the current beneªciaries was fairly well balanced against that of cur-
rent earners and payers. Even if a considerable fraction of voters is 
foresighted and altruistic, this is unlikely to offset the effect of (ra-
tionally) selªsh voters. Simply put, can we imagine the U.S. Congress 
sitting on a public surplus of $10 trillion in order to smooth out the 
social insurance cost bubble? I think it is extremely unlikely that sur-
pluses would survive to meet the social insurance funding needs of 
future generations, and I suspect most taxpayers and voters would 
share my cynicism.56 
 Building a public surplus is probably not politically feasible. In 
fact, it would be a tremendous victory for ªscal austerity if we were to 
reduce the public debt to 25% of GDP by 2014. But this would entail a 
combination of tax increases and spending cuts of less than $2 trillion 
over the ten-year period against the CBO budget baseline, or perhaps 
$4 trillion against a more realistic baseline projection including certain 
2001 and 2003 tax act extensions.57 Austerity of this magnitude would 
appear to be lost in the round of calculations of the impending ªscal 
gap of $44 to $74 trillion.58 It seems unlikely, then, that near-term ªscal 
austerity will have much to do with how we deal with our social insur-
ance crisis. 
D. The Road Ahead 
 It is disappointing, but not surprising, that the current admini-
stration continues to push tax cuts and spending increases in the face 
of looming Social Security and Medicare insolvency. This is sympto-
                                                                                                                      
56 My colleague Alan Feld suggested that the biblical story of Joseph and the Pharaoh’s 
dream would provide a very useful analogy here, and I quite agree. In the Bible, Pharaoh 
dreams of seven lean cows swallowing seven fat cows and seven lean ears of corn swallow-
ing seven fat ears. See Genesis 41:1–57. Joseph interprets the dream to mean that Egypt will 
enjoy seven years of plenty followed by seven years of famine, and Pharaoh puts Joseph in 
charge of grain management. Joseph builds storage facilities and stockpiles grain during 
the seven years of plenty. As predicted, seven years of famine follow, and Egypt is well pre-
pared. Id. The moral of the story for our purposes is that storing grain is a great solution if 
you do not have to worry about rats. 
57 Calculations based on data from Budget and Economic Outlook, supra note 10, 
at 3 tbl.1-2, 91. 
58 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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matic of the difªculty of collective saving, and I would not expect to 
see signiªcant ªscal austerity under a second Bush or even a Kerry 
administration. So, what can, should, or will be done? 
 The most likely scenario is that little will be done over the next 
ten to twenty years and that we will maintain public debt at about 35% 
of GDP, while the projected ªscal imbalance continues to grow. This 
scenario is troubling, but perhaps not as dire or unfair as Professor 
Shaviro suggests. Ultimately, beneªts will have to be cut and taxes 
raised, but this scenario puts the most pressure on Medicare spend-
ing, which is the biggest part of the problem. Inevitable cuts in the 
baby boomers’ beneªts may cause some hardship, but their voting 
strength will limit the hardship, and the beneªt cuts will not be gen-
erationally unfair. The biggest problems in this scenario are that the 
working generation mid-century is likely to face very high tax rates 
and public debt will be pushed to untested limits. 
 A more responsible approach would be to begin curtailing future 
social insurance beneªts now. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Green-
span recently made such a proposal, and such action might be politi-
cally feasible if the cutbacks do not affect current retirees.59 Curtailing 
future beneªts today would tend to shift some of the burden borne by 
mid-twenty-ªrst century workers in the “do nothing” scenario to the 
baby boomers, thus increasing generational fairness. 
 The most responsible, and generationally fair, approach would be 
to begin curtailing future beneªts today and to shore up funding. As 
discussed above, I am extremely skeptical of our ability to pre-fund fu-
ture obligations within the current Social Security and Medicare struc-
tures.60 It is conceivable that the political economy problems could be 
overcome through substantial reform that results in effective sequestra-
tion of the trust funds from the “rest of government” accounts or even 
privatization, but it is unlikely. It is more promising, therefore, to focus 
efforts on the spending and beneªt side of the equation. 
IV. The Impact on “Big Government” 
 Before closing, let me respond brieºy to the principal point em-
phasized by Professor Shaviro in the present Article. He argues that 
the intergenerational redistribution that is inevitable if we do not 
change course should be viewed as “big government,” just like direct 
                                                                                                                      
59 See Edmund L. Andrews, To Trim Deªcit, Greenspan Urges Social Security and Medicare 
Cuts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 2004, at A1. 
60 See supra notes 33–56 and accompanying text. 
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government spending, and that, as a result, the present course leads 
to larger, not smaller, government.61 I agree in theory, but I am not 
persuaded fully by the argument for several reasons. 
 First, it is unclear how to weigh the distributional effects of inter-
generational transfers against the allocational effects of direct gov-
ernment involvement in programs like Medicare. I am sure, however, 
how the Bush administration would weigh them. They would consider 
the projected Medicare excess growth rates (relative to GDP growth) a 
classic “big government” issue. 
 Second, in adding up the various allocational and distributional 
effects, we should recognize that near-term ªscal restraint also has “big 
government” implications if restraint results in a public surplus. Sup-
pose Congress does begin building a public surplus that reduces inter-
generational redistribution. Professor Shaviro believes this will forestall 
an increase in the size of government, but we also must consider the 
size-of-government effects of the public surplus administration appara-
tus.62 Currently, the Social Security and Medicare trust funds are “in-
vested” in government securities. The fund managers are bookkeep-
ers, and management costs are low. In a world of public surpluses, 
funds would have to be invested in non-governmental securities, which 
would require an elaborate investment management apparatus. 
 Collective public surplus management may be more efªcient 
than private investment management, but this efªciency advantage 
does not address sufªciently the “big government” concern. If we en-
vision the same level and distribution of collective savings taking place 
within a purely public system, a mixed public/private system (for ex-
ample, mandatory individual accounts), or a purely private system, 
the allocative effects may be the same, but the governmental thumb-
print and big government charge will loom largest in the ªrst sce-
nario. My intuition is that the size of the government is more that just 
the sum of its allocational and distributional effects. One also must 
consider the degree of interference with individual autonomy. 
 Finally, it is worth noting that discretionary spending already is 
coming under pressure as a result of growing deªcits and public 
debt.63 Clearly, discretionary spending cuts cannot cure the ªscal im-
balance, but if the Republican Party is to retain the mantle of the 
                                                                                                                      
61 See Shaviro, supra note 1, at 1304–05. 
62 See id. 
63 See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Economic View: Managing the Deªcit with Plans to Spend, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 2004, at C4 (reporting that growth in domestic discretionary spending 
would be held below inºation under the recently promulgated House Budget blueprint). 
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party of ªscal responsibility, it must regain its focus on direct govern-
ment outlays in general, and discretionary spending in particular. 
Conclusion 
 Professor Shaviro’s article adds to a long list of signiªcant contri-
butions he has made to our understanding of Social Security, Medi-
care, and the tax systems. I certainly share Professor Shaviro’s concern 
with the outlook for U.S. social insurance and the burden we appear 
to be creating for future generations, and I agree with much of his 
analysis. Our differences lie in emphasis as much as substance. 
 In this Commentary, I have attempted to demonstrate the impor-
tance of disaggregating the Social Security and Medicare problems. 
Disaggregation is complicated by the fact that payroll taxes are some-
what arbitrarily divided between the systems, but clearly, Medicare 
represents the larger problem. This matters because Medicare’s pro-
jected excess growth rates cry out for an expenditure-side solution, 
and the signiªcant allocational effects of Medicare suggest that it is a 
legitimate “big government” target. 
 I also have argued that near-term ªscal austerity, although desir-
able for a host of reasons, is unlikely to have much impact on the reso-
lution of our long-range social insurance crisis. I reach this conclusion 
simply because the current public debt is such a small part of the 
long-term ªscal gap that we would have to create a sizeable near-term 
public surplus to have any real impact. History and political economy 
theory suggest that this is unlikely to happen. Of course, we should 
not dig a deeper hole for our descendents to ªll, but it seems more 
proªtable to focus on gradually reducing social insurance beneªts 
and controlling costs than attempting to improve social insurance 
funding. 
 Professor Shaviro’s argument that deªcits are unlikely to reduce 
the overall size of government, if we take into account the redistribu-
tional effects of massive intergenerational transfers, is provocative and 
certainly could be correct, but the calculus is complex and largely ig-
nores the role of individual autonomy. Even ignoring non-economic 
effects, however, one cannot predict which path—near-term ªscal aus-
terity or starving the beast—results in “bigger government.” Thus, 
when thinking about deªcits, debt, and the growing ªscal gap, I fall 
back to consideration of what is efªcient, fair, and achievable. That 
analysis is difªcult enough. 
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